E. H., et al v. Fair Lawn Board of Education by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-5-2018 
E. H., et al v. Fair Lawn Board of Education 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"E. H., et al v. Fair Lawn Board of Education" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 853. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/853 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2596 
_____________ 
 
E.I.H.; R.H., Individually and on behalf of L.H., 
                          
    Appellants 
v. 
 
FAIR LAWN BOARD OF EDUCATION 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-08658) 
District Judge:  Hon. Katharine S. Hayden  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 12, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON, District Judge 
 
(Filed: September 5, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION** 
______________ 
 
                                            
  The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, Senior United States District Judge for the 
District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 
 
**  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge 
 E.I.H. and R.H., individually and on behalf of their autistic daughter, L.H., appeal 
the District Court’s decision that L.H.’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) did not 
need to include nurse accompaniment on her bus route to school.  They also appeal the 
denial of attorneys’ fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).  
For the following reasons, we will reverse the June 30, 2017, Order of the District Court 
as we find the inclusion of the nurse on L.H.’s bus route to school was a related service 
necessary for inclusion within her IEP.  Because of this, we will remand the matter to the 
District Court to award attorneys’ fees in an amount deemed appropriate.  
I. 
L.H. is an autistic girl who attended New Beginnings School, an out of district 
placement in the Fair Lawn School District.1  Transportation to and from the school is 
listed as a “related service” in her IEP.  (A7).  On February 5, 2015, L.H. was taken to 
Hackensack University Medical Center after experiencing a seizure.  Hospital staff 
recommended medical follow-up with L.H.’s general pediatrician, and her parents took 
L.H. to her pediatric neurologist, Michael Katz, the next day.  Katz diagnosed L.H. with 
epilepsy and prescribed Diastat, a medication that must be administered rectally for 
seizures lasting longer than two minutes.   
On February 9, 2015, L.H.’s parents contacted her case manager at Fair Lawn, 
Michael Russomanno, to request that the District provide a health professional trained in 
                                            
1  It is unclear, based on information in the record, whether L.H. is still a student at 
New Beginnings or if she has graduated.  
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the administration of Diastat on L.H.’s bus.  After talks with the District, an aide was 
finally placed on L.H’s bus beginning on March 9, 2015.  Prior to the grant of the 
request, L.H.’s parents transported her to school for the period between February 9, 2015 
and March 9, 2015. 
Thereafter, School District personnel discussed whether they needed to amend 
L.H.’s IEP to add the nurse-transportation component.  Ultimately, they decided to add 
the service to L.H.’s individualized health plan (“IHP”) on the basis that the service was 
responding to a medical issue as opposed to an educational one.2  On February 26, 2015, 
L.H.’s parents filed a request for emergent relief and due process, claiming violations of 
the IDEA.  On March 27, 2015, while proceedings were pending, L.H.’s IHP was 
amended to state that “[w]hile awaiting diagnostic information the district is providing on 
the school bus a licensed medical professional to carry out medical orders regarding 
seizure medication [at the District’s expense].”  (A66). 
That same day, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Sandra Ann Robinson issued 
an emergent relief order requiring “that the medically trained individual continue on the 
transport with L.H. throughout the period of a due process hearing on this matter.”  (Id. at 
55).  After three days of hearings, ALJ Judge Jesse H. Strauss held as follows:  
                                            
2  Unlike an IEP, which incorporates a “Stay-Put” component, meaning a student’s 
IEP cannot be changed or disregarded at will,  20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), an IHP, such as the 
one presented by the Board to L.H., has no stay-put safeguard.  (App. 68).  An IHP is 
used when a student has medical problems that require monitoring but nevertheless do 
not affect the student’s ability to learn.  See N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:16-2.1(a)(10) 
(providing mandate for school nurses to create individualized health plans for students 
with chronic medical conditions, regardless of any connection to the student’s ability to 
learn). 
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Once [District physician] Dr. Muccini(sic) agreed that L.H. 
required a nurse on the bus as part of her transportation-related 
service notwithstanding his position that L.H. required 
additional and more definitive testing, the [relevant] 
regulations make it abundantly clear that the District was 
required to amend L.H.’s IEP to reflect the nursing service as 
part of the transportation related service, and I so 
CONCLUDE. . . . The District erred in not amending the 
related services portion of L.H.’s IEP.  If it were subsequently 
determined by more comprehensive testing that this service 
for L.H. was not necessary, the IEP can again be amended.   
 
(A68).  ALJ Strauss further found that the District should have reacted more promptly to 
L.H.’s request, and therefore ordered the District to pay L.H.’s parents $192 as 
compensation for previously transporting their daughter to and from school until the 
accompanying medical professional was provided.   
Having been successful in the administrative process, L.H. and her parents brought 
an action under the IDEA to recover the attorneys’ fees expended in obtaining the ALJ 
decision.  L.H. and her parents moved for summary judgment contending that the 
favorable outcome with the ALJ made them a “prevailing party” under the IDEA and 
entitled them to legal fees.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).  The School District cross-moved 
for summary judgment arguing that the ALJ’s decision regarding the inclusion of the 
transportation nurse within L.H.’s IEP as opposed to her IHP was incorrect.  
 The District Court, disagreeing with the ALJ’s finding, concluded that inclusion of 
a transportation nurse within L.H.’s IEP was not a “related service” necessary to enable 
“a free, appropriate public education as described in the individualized education 
program of the child.”  N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.9(a)(8)(incorporating the mandate in 
IDEA).  According to the District Court, the nurse’s presence was merely a health 
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precaution; that is, her obligation to tend to a medical issue that occurred on a school bus 
had nothing to do with L.H.’s ability to obtain an education.  In so finding, the District 
Court expressed its holding as follows: 
Although L.H.’s doctor diagnosed her with epilepsy, it is not 
the diagnosis of a medical condition in the abstract, but the 
impact that the medical condition has on a student’s ability to 
receive a [Free Appropriate Public Education, or “FAPE”] in 
the absence of the related service sought, that is relevant to 
whether the district must list that service in L.H.’s IEP [as 
opposed to her IHP].  The district physician’s recommendation 
to place a nurse on L.H.’s bus pending more definitive testing 
does not support the conclusion that the service was required 
in order for L.H. to receive a FAPE, as the ALJ held. 
 
(A6).   
After finding that L.H. and her parents had not “obtain[ed] relief on what they 
themselves deemed to be the ‘core issue’ in this case[,]” the District Court concluded that 
they were no longer “prevailing parties” under the IDEA, and thus were not entitled to 
attorneys’ fees.  (A8); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).  The District Court did, however, affirm 
the ALJ’s decision requiring reimbursement of the $192 for the transportation of L.H. 
while the medical professional was being assigned to her bus route.  L.H. and her parents 
timely appealed.     
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), (3)(A), and 
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review on an appeal 
from a grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. 
States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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III. 
 On appeal, L.H. and her parents argue that the District Court did not give adequate 
deference to the ALJ’s findings.  Related to that point, they argue that since the District 
Court was incorrect to overturn the ALJ’s findings, they are accordingly entitled to 
attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA.   
A. 
Under the IDEA, a district court is required to employ a standard of review that is 
peculiar to special education cases.  Referred to as “modified de novo” review, this 
standard requires that courts give “due weight” to the findings and conclusions of the 
ALJ.  S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Should the district court decide not to follow the ALJ’s factual conclusions, then 
it must explain its reasons for doing so.  Id.  The purpose of the due weight standard is to 
preclude a district court from substituting its own views regarding educational standards 
for those of an experienced hearing officer who is well-versed in interpreting relevant 
regulations and policy.  See Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of Clementon Sch. 
Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993).  In contrast to its factual findings, the ALJ’s 
conclusions of law are subject to plenary review by a district court.  D.K. v. Abington 
Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). 
L.H. and her parents assert that the District Court failed to afford the ALJ’s factual 
conclusions due weight.  We agree.   
The IDEA’s centerpiece is the IEP, which is “the package of special educational 
and related services designed to meet the unique needs of the disabled child.”  Carlisle 
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Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 526 (3d Cir. 1995).  A school district satisfies its 
obligation under the IDEA if it provides an eligible student with personalized instruction 
that includes “sufficient support services [needed] to permit the child to benefit 
educationally from that instruction.”  Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 
Westchester Cty., v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).  Anything considered to be a 
“related service”—i.e., a service necessary to assist a qualifying student in obtaining an 
education— must be listed in the student’s IEP.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).   
Relevant to our case, nursing services are required as a related service through an 
IEP “to the extent such services are designed to enable a child with a disability to receive 
a free, appropriate public education as described in the individualized education program 
of the child.”  N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.9(a)(8).  Transportation to and from school is 
deemed a related service that is required in an IEP if the service is necessary for the 
student to access and obtain educational benefits.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A); N.J. Admin. 
Code § 6A:14-3.9(a)(7).  Transportation services can include aides, equipment, assistive 
devices, or any accommodations for assistance as needed.  N.J. Admin. Code. 6A:27-5.1. 
Here there is no dispute that the provision of transportation itself was required and 
so was included in L.H.’s IEP.  In reversing the ALJ, the District Court relied heavily on 
the ALJ’s observation that the nurse may become unnecessary over time, “[i]f it were 
subsequently determined by more comprehensive testing that this service for L.H. was 
[no longer needed].”  (A68).  However, simply because the service may be limited in 
duration, does not, on its own, belie the conclusion that it was a necessary service needed 
to provide a FAPE.  In fact, the IDEA contemplates that a service included within an IEP 
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might be of limited duration.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII) (“The term 
‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written statement for each child 
with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with this section 
and that includes. . . the projected date for the beginning of the services. . ., and the 
anticipated frequency, location, and duration of those services.”).   
Moreover, the record clearly reflects that L.H. could not take the bus, which again, 
is a FAPE-required service, until a nurse was provided to administer the Diastat if 
needed.  It would thus seem beyond dispute that the nurse was thereby necessary, at that 
time, for L.H. to gain access to a FAPE, notwithstanding the possibility that this 
conclusion might change at a later date.  And, coinciding with that conclusion, if it was 
necessary for her to have the nurse to gain access to a FAPE, then it necessarily should 
have been included in her IEP, not her IHP.  To the extent the District Court disagreed 
with these factual determinations as found by the ALJ, it should have provided some 
reasoning — with citations to the record — for why it rejected those determinations.  S.H. 
336 F.3d at 270.  Simply put, the District Court did not do that here.   
 With regard to the cases cited by the District Court as grounds for reversal, we 
note that they themselves do not address what constitutes a related-service, since within 
those cases, the services discussed fell squarely within the statutory definition of a related 
service.  See, e.g., Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 890-91 (1984) (“The 
Court of Appeals was clearly correct in holding that [clean intermittent catheterization ]”  
“fall[s] squarely within the definition of a ‘supportive service’” because the child could 
not otherwise “attend school and thereby ‘benefit from special education.’”); Dep’t of 
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Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding in a single 
sentence, without further analysis, that the child’s “need . . . for maintenance of her 
tracheostomy tube falls within [the related services] definitions”).  Moreover, the holding 
of these cases dealt with legal questions not present in L.H.’s case.  See, e.g., id. at 812 
(whether the school district’s proposed offer of education was an adequate FAPE); Cedar 
Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F. ex rel. Charlene F., 526 U.S. 66, 75–76 (1999) 
(whether the services required for access to a FAPE constituted an unfair financial burden 
to the school district).   
 The District Court also seemed to think that it was significant that the cases upon 
which it relied dealt with health conditions more serious than L.H.’s.  See e.g., Irving 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 468 U.S. at 895 (dealing with clean intermittent catheterization 
throughout the day); Katherine D., 727 F.2d at 809 (dealing with a tracheostomy tube and 
suctioning of mucus in order to breathe); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 526 U.S. at 66 
(dealing with the need for a ventilator for a wheelchair-bound student to keep him alive).  
However, there is no severity threshold that must be met by one’s medical condition in 
order to qualify as a “related service,” and none of those cases suggest otherwise. 
  Here, accepting that L.H.’s bus transportation is already included in her IEP as a 
related service, and understanding—as the School District already does—that L.H. needs 
the nurse on the bus in order to safely get to school in the event of a seizure, it stands to 
reason that she would not be able to access her FAPE without the nurse.  And if that is 
the case, then the ALJ was correct to include the nurse within L.H.’s IEP as opposed to 
IHP.   
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B. 
Because L.H.’s IEP should have been amended to include the transportation nurse, 
we conclude that L.H. and her parents are entitled to attorneys’ fees.  The IDEA contains 
a fee-shifting provision, which provides in relevant part: 
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the 
court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees 
as part of the costs[] to a prevailing party who is the parent of 
a child with a disability. 
 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).  The test to determine prevailing party status is well-
established in our Circuit and requires a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff 
“obtained relief on a significant claim in the litigation”; and (2) whether there is “a 
‘causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained from the defendant.’”  
Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 Here, the inclusion of the nurse within L.H.’s IEP was the entire claim upon which 
this case was premised.  By finding that the nurse was a related service deserving of 
inclusion within her IEP, L.H. has “obtained relief on a significant claim in the 
litigation,” as a direct result of the litigation, thereby meeting the requirements for 
prevailing party status.  Id.  Moreover, the inclusion of the nurse within L.H.’s IEP was a 
significant change to her educational plan, and did not merely maintain the status quo—
this entitles Appellants to attorneys’ fees.  J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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IV.  
 Based on the foregoing, we will reverse the June 30, 2017, Order of the District 
Court, and remand for a determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded to 
Appellants. 
